1968, Die NATO erweiterte das bestehende ACE-High System um die Alternate Route. Durch die Erweiterung des Systems wurde die Verbindung zwischen Deutschland und Italien sichergestellt, zumal die Abschaltung der bisherigen Verbindung England, Frankreich, Italien nur noch eine Frage der Zeit war.
1968, Die NATO erweiterte das bestehende ACE-High System um die Alternate-Route. Durch die Erweiterung des Systems wurde die Verbindung zwischen Deutschland und Italien sichergestellt, zumal die Abschaltung der bisherigen Verbindung England, Frankreich, Italien nur noch eine Frage der Zeit war.
"Die von SHAPE festgelegte Mindestanforderung zwischen Roetgen (Lammersdorf) und Livorno beträgt 40 Kanäle, aus technischen Gründen muss die maximale Kapazität der Alternativen Route jedoch 60 Kanäle betragen." [4]
1.In reference b, the Interim Communications-Electronics Working Group discussed alternate routing of ACE-HIGH network, described in reference a, and made recommendations to the Military Committee.
2.Further amplifying information on the alternative solutlons available for the North-South link, and SACEUR appraisal of these alternatives, was sought by references c and d.
3.Reference e_ provides the following Information:
Amplifying Information
(1) The minimum requirement, as stated by SHAPE, between Roetgen and Livorno is 40 channels, tout for. technical reasons the maximum capacity of thé alternate route must be 60 channels.
(2) The alternate route based on the German offer, would provide, from October I967, 60 channels from Roetgento Kindsbach only at a cost of £80,000 per annum. Extension to Southern Germany is planned for April I968, with same capacity, at a cost of a further €80,000 per annum. \ent consists
This system, even when extended, will not fully meet NATO requirements, because a link between Southern Germany and Northern Italy would be required. Such a link can be provided by provision of NATO funded equipment, DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-04S2-Q2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE at a coat of £1,450,000, Further, interconnection between existing ACE-HIGH system and this alternative, would require additional NATO-funded equipment at a cosrt; o.f £510,000.Thus, for the first year, the total. cost-,of this solutionis £2,120,000. Further cost would be £160/000 per annum.
(3)The alternate route based on the United States offer would provide, from April 1967.. 24 channels from Roetgen to Montevenda at a cost of £430,000 per annum.
Interconnection, between existing ACE-HIGH system and this alternative, would require additional NATO-funded equip ment at a cost of £17000. This solution is only offered
on an interim basis. Thus, the total cost of this interim solution would be £447,000.
SHAPE Evaluation
(1) The solution, based on the German offer, is not acceptable to SHAPE because the system will not be complete ly available before April 1968, and is considered to-be
too costly. SHAPE notes that procurement of equipment and rental costs for one year, would become uneconomical before the end of that year, as compared with construction
cost of an entire new NATO system, which has been estimated at £2.5*000,000.
(2) The solution, based an the United States system, is not acceptable on a permanent basis, to SHAPE because:
(a) it would be available only until the comple tion of a NATO-funded solution
(b) provides only 24 circuits.
(3) Both solutions would require acceptance of the following disadvantages:
(a) Introduction of elements into ACE-HIGH network which are not under- SACEUR exclusive control.
(b) SHAPE would depend on national elements for system control, restoration and full time response.
(4) Both offers indicate that facilities would be available in time of crisis and war. However, if communi cations capacity is restricted during such periods, the SHAPE requirement would have to compete with national demands, with possible adverse results to SHAPE.
c. SHAPE Recommendations
(1) Strongly recommends Military Committee support of a NATO-owned permanent system as described in paragraph
(2) Recommends, as an Interim measure until completion of a NATO-owned system, acceptance of the United States offer.[4]